

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 010155
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/S-DKEOGH:LFS
APPROVED BY AF-RMMOOSE
AF-WBEDMONDSON
S/S-O:TGMARTIN

-----011023 132215Z /63

O 132134Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 010155

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PDEV

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: MOOSE-ROWLANDS CONVERSATION JANUARY 11

1. AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY DICK MOOSE AND FCO UNDER-
SECRETARY TED ROWLANDS DISCUSSED NAMIBIA DURING CONVER-
SATION AFTERNOON JANUARY 11.

2. ROWLANDS OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT THE
US AND UK MUST NOW ASK THEMSELVES HOW SERIOUS BOTH
PARTIES TO THE NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS ARE, AND ALSO ASK
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 010155

THEMSELVES HOW MUCH MORE THEY COULD DO. MOOSE SUG-
GESTED THAT THE WESTERN POWERS COULD NOT SIMPLY WALK
AWAY FROM THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA, BECAUSE IT WOULD
BECOME MORE SERIOUS IN THE FUTURE AND BECAUSE U.S.
POLICY HEAVILY COMMITTED TO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS.
MOREOVER, IT WAS NOT EVEN IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTEREST TO
HAVE AN INTERNAL SOLUTION IN NAMIBIA, BECAUSE THIS

WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY, AND INEVITABLY ATTRACT MORE MILITANT ATTENTION, CREATING A BIGGER PROBLEM FOR THE SAG. ROWLANDS AGREED, BUT SAID HE WISHED THAT SWAPO HAD BEEN MORE CLEVER IN PURSUING ITS NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. IT HAD GIVEN THE CONTACT GROUP LITTLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH. TO MOVE THE SAG, HE ASSERTED, WE MUST DELIVER SOMETHING FROM SWAPO.

3. MOOSE ARGUED THAT THE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF SWAPO AND THE SAG ARE ASYMMETRICAL. SWAPO APPEARS INTRANSIGENT, BUT IN FACT THE SAG HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO BE A BARGAINING AGENT, SINCE IT HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO BE IN NAMIBIA. MOOSE ADDED THAT THE US SIMPLY COULD NOT WALK AWAY FROM ITS COMMITMENT TO THE UN POSITION ON THE ILLEGALITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA. GIVING UP THIS POSITION WOULD COST US A GREAT DEAL, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA. ROWLANDS ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WESTERN FIVE HAD ASSUMED THE ROLE OF BROKER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CARRIED WITH IT A PRESUMPTION THAT THERE WAS SOME VALIDITY IN THE POSITIONS OF EACH SIDE, AND WHICH EXPOSED THE FIVE TO BEARING SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR A BREAKDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, SHOULD THIS OCCUR. HE NOTED THAT SOUTH AFRICA, PARTIALLY IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURE FROM THE FIVE, HAD MOVED AWAY FROM ITS EARLIER, WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE PLAN FOR NAMIBIA, TO SOMETHING WHICH WAS STILL UNACCEPTABLE, BUT WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 010155

COULD BE PORTRAYED AS REASONABLE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MOOSE ABOUT THE BRITISH RESERVATION ON THE SIZE OF THE UN FORCE, ROWLANDS SAID THIS WAS BASED ON HMG'S BELIEF THAT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE FIVE COULD COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A LARGER FORCE, NOR WAS IT REALISTIC WITHOUT SWAPO CONCESSIONS TO EXPECT THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ACCEPT SUCH A LARGE FORCE. MOOSE NOTED THAT THE SIZE OF THE UN FORCE COULD BE THE KEY TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM. NYERERE AND OBASANJO BOTH AGREED THAT A LARGE FORCE WAS CALLED FOR.

5. ROWLANDS SAID UK NOT INTRANSIGENT ON FORCE SIZE. HOWEVER, HE ARGUED THAT UNLESS SOME CONCESSIONS FROM SWAPO WERE OBTAINED, APPROACHING THE SAG WITH HIS PROPOSAL FOR A VERY LARGE FORCE WOULD BREAK DOWN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT, IF WE WANTED A LARGE UN FORCE, OBTAIN AGREEMENT FIRST FROM THE FRONT LINE AND THEN SWAPO ON SUCH A FORCE, AND THEN GO TO THE SAG STATING THAT IF THE SAG WERE TO AGREE, SWAPO WAS ALREADY ON BOARD.

6. MOOSE NOTED THAT SWAPO WAS INDEED DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH, BECAUSE ITS ONLY WEAPON WAS ITS INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AS THE SOLE AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF NAMIBIA. MOREOVER, IT DID NOT HAVE TO RESPOND TO PRESSURE FROM THE FRONT LINE AND THE NIGERIANS AND WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE FROM ITS MAJOR SUPPLIERS.

7. ROWLANDS REVIEWED THE SOUTH AFRICAN TACTICS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THEIR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR TROOP STRENGTHS AND THEIR DECISION NOT TO PROCEED WITH THE TURNHALLE PLAN. ALTHOUGH BOTH THESE STILL LEFT THE SAG IN CONTROL IN NAMIBIA, IT COULD PORTRAY ITSELF AS REASON-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 010155

ABLE, ASKING WHAT CONCESSIONS SWAPO HAD MADE. GIVEN THIS SAG POSTURE, AND SWAPO'S INTRANSIGENCE, ROWLANDS SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST FOR THE WESTERN HONEST BROKERS TO GIVE UP OUR EFFORTS, WHILE TABLING PROPOSALS WHICH WE THINK ARE FAIR, LEAVING THE WORLD TO JUDGE THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE OTHER PARTIES' POSITIONS. WOULD THIS, HE ASKED, DAMAGE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IN AFRICA?

8. EDMONDSON OF AF AND BRITISH EMBOFF SQUIRE REMINDED THE GROUP THAT IN THE APPROACH TO THE SAG IN APRIL 1977, THE FIVE HAD POINTED OUT TO THE SAG THAT THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR STERN MEASURES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IF AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT TO THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED.

9. MOOSE, COMING BACK TO THE IDEA OF BRINGING FURTHER PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SWAPO, ASKED IF THERE WERE SOME WAY TO USE PUBLICATION OF THE PROPOSALS TO BRING THE FRONT LINE TO WORK ON SWAPO. ROWLANDS AT FIRST ASSERTED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP SHOULD NOT PUBLISH ITS PROPOSAL UNTIL THERE WAS NOTHING ELSE IT COULD DO, BUT EDMONDSON SUGGESTED THAT EARLIER PUBLICATION MIGHT BE A WAY OF BRINGING PRESSURE NOT ONLY FROM THE FRONT LINE BUT OTHER NAMIBIAN ELEMENTS TO BEAR ON SWAPO FOR A SETTLEMENT. ROWLANDS PICKING UP THAT IDEA SUGGESTED WE MIGHT SIT DOWN AND WORK OUT WHAT THE FIVE BELIEVED WOULD FILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 385. MOOSE SAID THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT ALLOWING SWAPO AND THE SAG TO SET THE PARAMETERS. SETTING ASIDE THEIR POSITIONS FOR THE MOMENT, WE COULD TRY TO WORK OUT A REASONABLE PACKAGE AND THEN GO BACK TO THE FRONT LINE AND SWAPO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 010155

10. MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE A WAY OUT OF THE BOX WE WERE NOW IN ON TIMING. HE REMINDED THE GROUP THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BACKED AWAY FROM DISCUSSION OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER, AND STATED HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD BEEN SURPRISED WHEN THEY FOUND OUT HOW FAR THE CONTACT GROUP

HAD GONE IN ITS DISCUSSIONS IN LUANDA. THE RESULTS OF THOSE TALKS MAY HAVE CAUSED THE SAG TO FEEL THAT THEY WOULD LOSE THE JUSTIFICATION FOR MAINTAINING FORCES ON THE NAMIBIAN BORDER.

11. ROWLANDS SUGGESTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE IMMINENT DATE (JANUARY 27) FOR A SOUTH AFRICAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA MIGHT BE HANDLED BY SUGGESTING TO THEM THAT RATHER THAN MAKE SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT THEY COULD MEET ANY OBLIGATIONS THEY MIGHT FEEL TO OTHERS IN NAMIBIA BY STATING NOW THAT THEY REMAINED FIRMLY COMMITTED TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE BY DECEMBER 31, 1978, AND WOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MEET THAT DEADLINE.

CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE010155
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: DKEOGH:LFS
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780021-0168
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780164/aaaaccey.tel
Line Count: 199
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f51dfce3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3776241
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAMIBIA: MOOSE-ROWLANDS CONVERSATION JANUARY 11
TAGS: PDEV, US, UK, WA, (MOOSE, RICHARD), (ROWLANDS, TED)
To: USUN NEW YORK LONDON
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f51dfce3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014